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ABSTRACT
It has been 20 years since the concept of the Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network (AOSN) was first
introduced. This vision has been brought closer to reality with the introduction of underwater gliders.While in
terms of functionality the underwater glider has shown to be capable of meeting the AOSN vision, in terms of
reliability there is no communitywide hard evidence on whether persistent presence is currently being ach-
ieved. This paper studies the reliability of underwater gliders in order to assess the feasibility of using these
platforms for future AOSN. The data used are taken from nonunderwater glider developers, which consisted
of 205 glider deployments by 12 European laboratories between 2008 and 2012. Risk profiles were calculated
for two makes of deep underwater gliders; there is no statistically significant difference between them. Re-
gardless of the make, the probability of a deep underwater glider surviving a 90-day mission without a pre-
mature mission end is approximately 0.5. The probability of a shallow underwater glider surviving a 30-day
mission without a premature mission end is 0.59. This implies that to date factors other than the energy
available are preventing underwater gliders from achieving their maximum capability. This reliability in-
formation was used to quantify the likelihood of two reported underwater glider surveys meeting the ob-
servation needs for a period of 6 months and to quantify the level of redundancy needed in order to increase
the likelihood of meeting the observation needs.
1. Introduction
There has been a significant increase in the use of
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) during the
last decade and this trend seems set to continue (e.g.,
see the summary of a market report at http://www.
douglas-westwood.com/shop/shop-infopage.php?longref5
902;0#.UVlK8BlBH8g). We suggest there are two key
reasons: first, ship-based field work is very expensive;
and second, these vehicles, whether in industry or sci-
entific research, have been shown to be capable of ob-
taining valuable data that augment preexisting means,
such asmoorings, towed systems, and profiling floats (see
special issue of Limnology and Oceanography, 2008,
Vol. 53, No. 5, part 2). Nevertheless, it is appropriate to
ask if they have yet fulfilled their true potential. Twenty
years ago, Curtin et al. (1993) presented the requirements
for an Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network (AOSN)
that comprised several autonomous underwater vehicles
and a distributed set of acoustic and point sensors to
enable four-dimensional ocean sampling. Since then,
several concerted efforts have developed and tested
technology to implement this vision. One of the most
significant developments is a class of autonomous under-
water vehicles denoted as underwater gliders (Stommel
1989). These slow-moving, long-endurance, compact, af-
fordable, buoyancy-driven vehicles can be used for mon-
itoring large and mesoscale processes that are currently
impossible to do using conventional, propeller-driven
AUVs or moorings, and expensive if using research
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ships and towed vehicles. A number of marine science
programs have demonstrated the benefits of underwater
gliders. For example, Perry et al. (2008) discussed using
an underwater glider to gain deep understanding of
blooms located off the coast of Washington State. Perry
et al. gathered evidence to conclude that what satellite
imagery led scientists to believe was an autumn
bloom caused by destratification was instead a vertical
redistribution of phytoplankton. Furthermore, the
authors concluded that the concentration at the chloro-
phyll maxima was 3 times that predicted using only sat-
ellite imagery. Todd et al. (2011) used underwater gliders
to assess the underwater effects of El Niño on the Cali-
fornian Current System (CCS). The authors concluded
that while the CCS was unusually warm and isopycnals
unusually deep, there were no anomalous water masses
in the region. Hátún et al. (2007) used two underwater
gliders to sample eddies in order to understand how
these contribute to the rapid restratification of the Lab-
rador Sea interior following wintertime convention.
Developments in communications, intelligent mission
planning, and sampling methods devised over the years
have brought the AOSN vision closer to reality (Curtin
et al. 2005; Leonard et al. 2010; Alvarez and Mourre
2012a,b; L’Hévéder et al. 2013). Are we now at the stage
when users can plan glider missions in full expectation of
being able to achieve missions only limited by the sensors
and the stored energy? To answer that question requires
a study of how well gliders have performed on actual
missions. However, over the years little or no study has
beenmade on the reliability of underwater gliders. Results
of risk, reliability, and availability analyses conducted for
propeller-driven autonomous underwater vehicles (Brito
et al. 2010; Brito and Griffiths 2011; Brito et al. 2012;
Podder et al. 2004; Griffiths et al. 2003) cannot be used to
infer the reliability of underwater gliders because details
of implementation in hardware and software matter.
This paper investigates the reliability of underwater
gliders, resulting in a risk profile as a function of mission
endurance based on the operational history of 56 un-
derwater gliders during the period January 2008–May
2012. The success of glider missions is dependent upon
a number of factors: the inherent reliability of the
component parts, the service history of the vehicles, the
environment in which they operate, and the practices
and procedures of the vehicle operators. We have not
attempted to separate all of these factors. The focus here
is to create a risk profile based on user experiences using
commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) gliders.
Following the creation of the risk profile, we study the
effect of some potential covariates in the risk profile.We
close with a probabilistic method for quantifying the
likelihood of a set of underwater gliders providing
coverage for a predefined observation time. This process
allows the user to estimate howmany underwater gliders
are required in order to meet a given ocean coverage.
2. Underwater gliders
Gliders propel themselves by use of a buoyancy engine
and thus must follow a sawtooth trajectory through the
water. The horizontal speed is typically about 1 kmh21.
By traveling slowly and using minimal power, they are
able to achieve endurance of several months. The first
scientific missions with gliders were undertaken by the
teams who developed the vehicles and their collaborators
(e.g., Rudnick et al. 2004). But since about 2005, gliders
have become available to the wider scientific community
andCOTSunderwater gliders are being increasingly used
by a growing number of institutions. At the time of this
study, there were three main COTS underwater gliders:
the Slocum (Webb et al. 2001), the Seaglider 1000
(Eriksen et al. 2001), and the Spray (Sherman et al.
2001).1 These are typically equipped with conductivity,
temperature, depth, fluorescence, and optical backscatter
sensors, but many other sensors have been used.
3. Ocean coverage estimation
The term ocean coverage is used here to describe the
likelihood that a target areawill be observed for a required
period of time. The ocean coverage is therefore inherently
dependent on the glider reliability. Thus, in this section we
will first address the problem of estimating underwater
glider survival with mission endurance. Two approaches
are presented. First, we present a nonparametric method
for estimating the probability of survival of an underwater
glider. In this paper we consider two different conse-
quences of failure and therefore the term survival has two
meanings. We use probability of survival to denote the
likelihood of an underwater glider surviving a mission
without premature end. The term probability of survival is
also used to capture the likelihood of an underwater glider
surviving a mission without loss. The Kaplan–Meier sur-
vival estimator is used for modeling both scenarios. The
probability of survival varies with travel time. A second
method, the Cox proportional-hazards model, is then
presented to assess the impact of covariates.
a. Survival estimation
Methods for estimating the probability of survival
based on historic data can be parametric and
1More recent gliders such as the Exocetus coastal glider and the
SeaExplorer were not generally available during the study period.
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nonparametric (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980). Para-
metric models assume that the probability of failure
follows a particular trend, such as linear increasing
failure rate or constant rate over time. Nonparametric
models make no assumption with regard to the failure
distribution. The survival dataset consists of two types of
data: failure data and censored data. Failure data con-
sists of the recorded time at which failure took place. In
statistical survival modeling, a censored entry is an ob-
servation where failure was not observed. In our analysis
when a glider is known to have survived a given mission
time, this is denoted a right censored data entry. The
Kaplan–Meier estimator [Eq. (1)] is a typical method for
estimating the probability of survival based on the fail-
ure history. It estimates the probability of failure in
a given interval, from the fraction of the number of entries
that failed at that interval over the number of entries that
have not failed. The number of entries that have not failed
prior to interval i are denoted by ni. The number of entries
that have failed during interval i are denoted as di. The
estimator uses the product rule for calculating the prob-
ability S^(k) of a system surviving a sequence of k intervals,
S^(k)5P
i5k
i50

ni2 di
ni

. (1)
The variance for the original Kaplan–Meier estimator is
typically computed using the ‘‘exponential’’ Greenwood
formula (Prentice and Kalbfleisch 2002), defined as
V^(k)5
1
[logS^(k)]2

n
i
,k
di
ni(ni2 di)
. (2)
The variance is a function of the number of entries at any
given interval. It is very important to take into account the
variance, as this has a direct effect on the confidence limits
for the survival estimates as presented in Eqs. (3) and (4):
expf2exp[c1(k)]g, S^(k), expf2exp[c2(k)]g , (3)
where
c6(k)5 log[2logS^(k)]6 za/2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ^
V
p
, (4)
andwhere za/2 is the uppera/2 point of the standard normal
distribution; the 5%point is used in this paper, which is 1.96.
IfZ is a randomvariable that has anormal distribution, then
the upper a/2 point of this distribution is that value of za/2,
which is such that P(Z. za/2)5 a/2. This probability is the
area under the standard normal curve to the right of za/2.
b. Proportional hazards analysis
Estimating whether other variables have an influence
on risk is almost as important as the estimation of risk
itself. The basic Cox proportional hazards model (Cox
1972) attempts to fit survival data with covariates z to
a hazard function, where z is a vector of covariates: z 5
(z1, z2, . . . , zn). In the literature, covariates are also
denoted as explanatory variables; these are variables
that may or may not have an influence on the hazard
rate. The hazard function is the ratio between the failure
density distribution and the cumulative survival func-
tion. The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that
the baseline hazard h0(t) is proportional to the explan-
atory variables by a constant coefficient b. Here b is
a vector of proportional coefficients, b 5 (b1, b2, . . . ,
bn). The formulation for the Cox proportional hazards
model is presented in Eq. (5):
h(t j z)5 h0(t)eb1z11b2z21⋯bnzn . (5)
The b coefficients are the unknown parameters in the
model. These can be estimated using the method of
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Using this
technique, b is obtained by maximizing the partial
likelihood given by the product over the r events. Cox
(1972) showed that the likelihood function for the pro-
portional for the proportional hazards model [Eq. (5)] is
given by
L(b)5P
r
j51
exp(bjzj)

n
j
l51
exp(bjzl)
. (6)
If the b coefficient is greater than 0, an increase in the
respective explanatory variable causes an increase in the
hazard rate. If the b coefficient is lower than 0, it means
that an increase in the respective explanatory variable
causes a decrease in the hazard. A proportional co-
efficient of 0 means that the explanatory variable has no
effect on the hazard rate.
The Cox proportional hazards model is very useful for
comparing two groups of survival times, corresponding
to, for example, two different vehicle makes for the
same operational conditions or two different operating
conditions for the same vehicle make. This hypothesis
test is a procedure that enables us to assess the extent to
which an observed set of data is consistent with a null
hypothesis, where the null hypothesis represents the
view there is no difference between two groups of sur-
vival data. In section 6, we use this approach for quanti-
fying the effect of different conditions on the hazard rate.
c. Coverage estimation
Having presented means for quantifying the likeli-
hood of a glider surviving a given time, this section ad-
dresses the question of how many gliders are needed in
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order to meet a given coverage. We start with the known
probability of failure and then use probability rules for
deriving the formulation used for calculating the coverage.
Given thatwe knowan instantiation of the probability of
failure p(T), at or before timeT, which wewill denote as p.
If we wish to improve the probability of continuous mon-
itoring during the time T, then we could deploy more than
one glider. Theprobability of r failures among a groupofN
gliders can be computed using the binomial distribution
PN(r, 1)5

N
r

pr(12 p)N2r , (7)
where

N
r

, also denoted as r choose N, rCN is
N!/r!(N2 r)!. The probability that at least one glider
survives for the time T is given by
12PN(N, 1)5 12 p
N . (8)
If the period of observations required exceeds the total
endurance, then multiple missions are required forM se-
quential mission each withN gliders. The probability of at
least one glider surviving eachmission can be calculated as
Psurv5 [12PN(N, 1)]
M5 (12 pN)M . (9)
4. GROOM underwater glider operational history
The task of gathering a broad representative sample
of operational histories of glider deployments was
undertaken as part of a EuropeanUnion (EU) Seventh
Framework Programme for Research and Techno-
logical Development project, Gliders for Research,
OceanObservation andManagement (GROOM). The
GROOM project (see http://www.groom-fp7.eu/doku.
php) has 18 European partners, of which 12 operate
gliders, working together to ‘‘design a new European
Research Infrastructure that uses underwater gliders for
collecting oceanographic data.’’ The participants were
encouraged to provide operational data representative
of a period of 2 years of operation. An online survey
prompted the user to enter 1) the organization name;
2) the point of contact; 3) vehicle identifier; 4) start of
mission date; 5) vehicle type (SlocumG1 shallow, Slocum
G1 Deep, Slocum G2 Shallow, Slocum G2 Deep, Sea-
glider1000, Spray); 6) mission type (shelf deployment,
shelf-edge deployment, deep-ocean deployment); 7) mis-
sion length in days; 8) mission maximum depth in me-
ters; 9) did the mission end in failure (yes or no); 10) was
the premission test successful? and 11) was the vehicle
recovered at the end of the mission?
If the mission had ended in failure, the user was
prompted to select from 15 primary causes: 1) collision
with vessel; 2) collision with seabed; 3) collision with
nets or other obstacle; 4) Iridium communications fail-
ure; 5) leak; 6) buoyancy pump failure; 7) power/battery
failure; 8) command/control software failure (includes
BaseStation); 9) onboard software failure; 10) data-
logging failure; 11) navigation sensor failure—GPS;
12) attitude sensor failure (heading, pitch, or roll);
13) sensor failure; 14) altitude control; and 15) other failure
(in this case, the user was encourage to write more details).
If the mission had ended in failure, the user was prompted
to answer what was the status of the altimeter at the time
of the fault (bottom within range, bottom outside range).
In practice there may be a causation relation between
some of the 15 primary causes. For example, a connector
leak may cause a power failure. For this study we asked
the users to specify the root cause as the primary cause
for the incident. For the particular example, where
a leak causes a power failure, which then causes a pre-
mature end of the mission, we expect the user to di-
agnose the leak as the primary cause for the premature
mission end.
If the hypothesis is not thoroughly tested and evidence
is not considered, then the task of fault diagnosis can be
subject to epistemic uncertainty. In this study we assume
that this has not been the case and that all primary faults
are correctly diagnosed.
Among underwater glider operators the words abort
and mission can have different technical meanings, so
we clarify here themeaning as used in this paper.We use
the word mission to refer to a single glider operation
from the time of deployment to the time of recovery. A
successful mission is one where operation continued
until the planned recovery. During a mission there may
be a technical problem, but if these are resolved without
having to end the mission prematurely, we class the
mission as successful. If, however, the mission is termi-
nated prematurely because of technical issues, then we
class this as an aborted mission.
a. Mission statistics
Reports were received on 205 missions carried out by
56 underwater gliders. The number of missions and the
number of gliders used varied significantly from one
institution to another (Table 1). The statistics for dif-
ferent vehicle makes are presented below (see Table 2).
As noted previously the success of glider missions is
dependent not just on the reliability of the particular
type of glider used but also on the service history of the
vehicle, the environment in which it operates, and the
practices and procedures of the operators. Furthermore,
whether failure leads to loss of the vehicle is very much
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dependent upon the available options for recovery. In
our survey, five of the vehicles that were lost were Sea-
gliders deployed in Arctic or Antarctic waters, where
there are very limited opportunities for emergency re-
covery. Thus, although more Seagliders were lost, it is
not possible to conclude that they are inherently more
likely to be lost than Slocums.
b. Failure modes
A total of 63 mission aborts were recorded during the
205 missions. Seventeen specific failure modes have
been identified (Fig. 1). For four failures the root cause
remains unknown. In general, there are a small number
of observations for each failure mode; therefore, it is not
possible to infer if a particular vehicle make is more
prone to a particular failure mode than another make.
However, for the three most common failure modes, we
have compared the failure rate for Slocum gliders (deep,
shallow, G1, and G2) with that for Seagliders. The re-
sults are shown in Table 3.
The hypotheses test is a procedure that enables us to
assess the extent to which an observed set of data is
TABLE 1. Summary of the data provided by the participating oceanographic laboratories.
Centre name
No. of
missions
Start date–end
date
No. of
vehicles
Median
endurance
(days)
Operation environment
Shelf
Shelf
edge (%)
Deep
ocean (%)
Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique (CNRS)
56 Apr 2010–Mar 2012 14 32 12 84 4
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientíﬁcas (CSIC)
14 Apr 2011–May 2011 5 19 — — 100
Istituto Nazionale di Oceanografia
e di Geofisica Sperimentale (OGS)
4 Jun 2008–Jul 2010 2 13 75 — 25
Alfred-Wegener-Institut für
Polar- und Meeresforschung (AWI)
8 Jul 2008–Jul 2012 4 69 — — 100
Consorcio para el Diseño,
Construcción, Equipamiento
y Explotación de la Plataforma
Oceánica de Canarias (PLOCAN)
14 Dec 2010–Oct 2012 4 13 7 22 71
University of East Anglia (UEA) 12 Mar 2010–Jan 2012 8 49 42 50 8
Oceanography Centre, University of
Cyprus (OC-UCY)
7 Mar 2009–Dec 2011 2 80 71 29
Institut für Meereswissenschaften–
Research Center for Marine
Geosciences (IFM-GEOMAR)
3 Jun 2011–Nov 2012 1 14 — — 100
Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht–
Zentrum für Material- und
Küstenforschung
GMBH (HZG)
12 Dec 2010–Jun 2012 2 23 100 — —
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Undersea Research Centre
(NURC)
63 Jun 2010–Sep 2012 8 4 33 30 37
Scottish Association for Marine Science
(SAMS)
3 Oct 2009–Sep 2012 2 123 — 33 67
Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC)
9 Jul 2010–Aug 2012 4 39 — 33 67
TABLE 2. Glider operation statistics.
Seaglider 1000m Slocum G1 shallow Slocum G1 deep Slocum G2 shallow Slocum G2 deep
No. of missions 42 68 72 9 14
Total endurance (days) 2514.5 772.05 1728 188 550.1
Median endurance (days) 64 7.65 19.5 18 12
Upper quartile (days) 80 15 37 25 25.8
Max endurance (days) 169 56 105 48 184
No. of aborts due to failures 19 13 23 3 5
Abort rate (per day) 0.007 56 0.0168 0.0133 0.0159 0.009 09
No. of losses 7 2 1 0 0
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consistent with a particular hypothesis, known as the
null hypothesis. A null hypothesis represents a simpli-
fied view that specifies that there is no difference be-
tween the two groups of survival data. For each failure
mode, we tested the null hypothesis that the failure
rate for Slocums and Seagliders was indistinguishable.
By comparing the actual difference in failure rates with
the standard error of the difference, the probability of
true failure rates being different can be calculated
using the two proportion z test. The z test is a common
statistical significance test that can be used for testing
the hypothesis that differences in proportion of two
sets of data are not statistical significant (O’Connor
2002).
Failure due to a leak was the most observed failure
mode. Out of the 15 failures, 14 occurred on Slocum
vehicles; so, the rate of occurrence was about 3 times
greater for Slocum gliders. One possible explanation is
that Slocum vehicles are opened by users more often
than Seaglider1000s, as Seagliders have generally been
serviced by the makers. Therefore, the O-rings of the
Slocum vehicles tend to be more disturbed than the
O-rings on the Seaglider1000.
The second most common failure mode was power/
battery issues; these occurred 7 times more frequently
for Seagliders than for Slocums. Seagliders employ
lithium batteries, while Slocums can be set to employ
either lithium or alkaline batteries. This may be the root
of the observed differences in failure rate. However, we
did not collect data concerning the type of battery
employed on all Slocums in the dataset. Therefore,
without further information we cannot test whether
battery chemistry was a contributory factor in the dif-
ferent failure rates.
The third most common failure mode was buoyancy
pump failure. The failure rates for the two different
underwater glider makes are indistinguishable for this
failure mode.
c. Failure analysis
Underlying the procedure used in this section is the
assumption that there are no significant differences be-
tween survival times of each group; that is, the differ-
ence that has been observed is due to chance variation.
Two well-known tests used for comparing survival dis-
tributions are the log-rank and the Wilcoxon tests
(Collett 2003).
When we applied these tests to compare the survival
distributions of the Seaglider 1000 and SlocumG1 deep,
we concluded that there is no evidence against the null
hypothesis. As presented in column 3 of Table 4, the
values of P from both tests suggest that differences be-
tween the survival of the Seaglider 1000 and that of
a Slocum G1 deep are not statistically significant. When
we compared the Slocum G2 deep survival distribution
with the distribution of the aggregated dataset of Slo-
cum G1 deep and Seaglider 1000, we concluded that
that there is no evidence against the null hypothesis.
Since the differences between the failure distributions
of Seaglider1000, Slocum G1 deep, and Slocum G2
deep are not statistically significant, we can aggregate
the mission data of these three vehicles to make
a unique dataset that represents the operational history of
deep underwater gliders. If we consider the shallow
gliders—SlocumG1 shallow and SlocumG2 shallow—the
FIG. 1. Failure modes for all underwater gliders, shallow and
deep.
TABLE 3. Breakdown of the top three failure modes and the confidence that the failure mode is vehicle dependent.
Failure mode
Slocums Seaglider1000s
Confidence (%)No. of failures Failure rate No. of failures Failure rate
Leaks 14 0.0859 1 0.0238 91
Power/battery failure 3 0.0184 6 0.143 97
Buoyancy pump failure 5 0.0307 1 0.0238 57
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large values of P indicate that the difference in the
failure distribution for these two types of vehicles is
not statistically significant. Therefore, the operational
history for both vehicles can be aggregated to form
a unique dataset corresponding to shallow underwater
gliders.
5. Underwater gliders survival
Herewe present the results of survival analysis carried
out on the glider mission data collected from the
GROOM project participants. A mission risk profile is
created for each type of underwater glider and the Cox
proportional hazards method, presented in section 3b, is
used for estimating the effect of different covariates.
The survival analyses are carried for two scenarios:
abort and loss.
a. Likelihood of underwater glider abort
The analyses were carried out for the deep un-
derwater gliders and for the shallow underwater gliders
separately. The deep underwater gliders’ dataset con-
sisted of 128 missions; the shallow of 77 missions. The
probability of a vehicle completing its planned mission
without aborting is presented in Figs. 2a and 2b. The
95% confidence limits are presented in gray; they in-
crease with endurance, as there are fewer missions of
longer endurance.
The probability of the mission not ending in abort
decreases relatively rapidly during the first 15 days for
deep gliders and the first 5 days for shallow gliders, but
after this time the probability appears to decrease at
a constant rate. This suggests that the failure rate is al-
most constant with time beyond the first few days; that
is, for example, failures are just as likely to emerge in the
sixth week of deployment as during the fourth week.
This contrasts with the profiles for the Autosub and
International Submarine Engineering Limited (ISE)
Explorer propeller-driven AUVs, where the risk profile
reduces more significantly in the first tens of kilometers,
allowing risk mitigation by monitoring the vehicle for
this distance before committing to the mission (Brito
et al. 2010, 2012). Because of the almost constant failure
rate, a monitoring distance would not be as effective as
a risk mitigation strategy for gliders.
b. Likelihood of underwater glider loss
In the 205missions considered in this study, 10 of them
resulted in vehicle loss, 8 of the losses were for deep
underwater gliders, and 2 of the losses were for shallow
underwater gliders. The probability of a shallow un-
derwater glider surviving a deployment is presented in
Fig. 2c, and the probability of survival of a deep under-
water glider is presented in Fig. 2d. For shallow un-
derwater gliders, the survival distribution shows that the
probability of a glider surviving a 30-day mission is 0.9.
The probability of a deep underwater glider vehicle sur-
viving a 30-day mission is 0.97. For both distributions the
95% confidence interval is quite large.
6. Proportional hazards
The proportional hazardsmethod (section 4) was used
to examine evidence on whether operational factors
influenced the abort and loss outcomes. The analyses
were carried out using the JMP 7 statistical analysis tool
from the Statistical Analysis System Institute, Inc.
(SAS). The estimates for the hazard analysis are pre-
sented in Table 5.
a. Effect of operational depth
For the abort scenario, results show that there is a high
confidence in the proportional hazards estimates for
both shallow and deep gliders. Negative values for b1
indicate that the probability of an abort reduces with
increasing operational depth; see Eq. (5). For the loss
scenario, results show that there is no dependency be-
tween the probability of loss and the glider operational
depth. The P values for both shallow and deep gliders
are large.
b. Effect of altimeter status
One of the ‘‘autonomous’’ behaviors of the glider is in
its ability to detect and react to the presence of the
TABLE 4. Comparison of the survival of different underwater glider makes. Deep gliders include Seaglider1000, Slocum G1 deep, and
Slocum G2 deep. Shallow gliders include Slocum G1 shallow and Slocum G2 shallow.
Statistical test
Deep gliders Shallow gliders
Seaglider1000 compared
to Slocum G1
Seaglider1000 and Slocum
deep G1 compared to
Slocum deep G2
Slocum G1 shallow
compared to Slocum
G2 shallow
x2 P x2 P x2 P
Wilcoxon test 1.4966 0.2212 2.2008 0.3327 0.4679 0.4938
Log-rank test 1.3823 0.2697 1.3787 0.5019 0.0003 0.9872
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seafloor; that is, it can determine when to inflect if
the bottom depth is less than the commanded inflexion.
Getting this wrong could lead to collision with the sea-
floor and possible consequential damage, for example, to
the hull (leaks), the sensors, possibly the communications
antenna, and possibly the external bladder, giving rise to
a buoyancy engine problem. In this section we attempt to
establish whether there is a correlation between the ve-
hicle loss and the status of the altimeter.
For 7 of the 16 aborts that occurred on shallow vehi-
cles, the bottom was outside the range of the altimeter.
Of the 47 failures that occurred on deep underwater
gliders, for 16 of them the vehicle was within altimeter
range of the bottom. For both shallow and deep gliders,
the proportional hazards analyses confirm that there is
no correlation between the status of the altimeter and
the probability of the glider being lost. A possible ex-
planation for this is that gliders move very slowly. Thus,
unless the environment is energetic (e.g., fast near-
bottom currents) and/or strewn with obstacles, such as
fishing gear or large rocks, collision with the seafloor is
not typically traumatic. This perhaps explains the lack of
relationship between altimeter status and vehicle loss.
7. Example of coverage estimation
The previous two sections have used reliability mod-
eling methods for quantifying the reliability of un-
derwater gliders as a function of mission endurance and
the effect of explanatory variables on the risk profile. The
explanatory variables considered were the maximum
operating depth of the altimeter status. In this section we
move from a problem of a single-vehicle deployment to
a problem ofmultivehicle deployment. In this section we
assess the impact of underwater glider reliability on
TABLE 5. Statistics on the proportional hazards analysis: b1 is the
proportional constant, L is the lower confidence limit, and U is the
upper confidence limit for the proportional constant.
Covariate Scenario Statistics
Shallow
gliders
Deep
gliders
Operational
depth
Abort b1 20.009 679 20.001 615
P 0.0042 0.003
Loss b1 0.019 691 64 20.000 882 7
P 0.2526 0.5687
Altimeter
status
Loss b1 9.5424 0.1235
P 0.0959 0.7379
FIG. 2. Probability of survival distributions: (a) probability of surviving without aborting for shallow gliders;
(b) probability of surviving without aborting for deep gliders; (c) probability of surviving, without loss, for shallow
gliders; and (d) probability of surviving, without loss, for a deep glider.
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mission planning. In subsection 7a, we consider the sit-
uation where a single glider is required to survey an area
for a long period of time. Two case studies are consid-
ered, a 180-day mission and a 360-day mission. We es-
timate the likelihood of this survey being successful.
Then we consider the impact of adding redundancy, that
is, using multiple gliders to improve reliability.
A small number of glider fleet configurations have
been tested in recent years, with different degrees of
success (Rudnick et al. 2004; Hodges and Fratantoni
2009; Testor et al. 2007). In this section we consider the
impact of underwater glider reliability on the risk of
a glider network design and operation. In subsection 7b
we conduct reliability analysis of the ‘‘virtual’’ mooring
array proposed by Hodges and Fratantoni (2009). In
subsection 7c we considered the network design pro-
posed by L’Hévéder et al. (2013).
a. Single measurement location
The huge benefit of underwater gliders is the ability
for long endurance missions. However, from the dataset
available to us, few missions make use of the full en-
durance. In this case study we consider that the aim is to
have at least one glider in continuous operation for
a given period of time, in a situation where replacement
gliders cannot be deployed to cover failures. The prob-
ability of achieving this, as a function of the number of
gliders, can be calculated using Eq. (9). Taking the deep
glider example, based on Fig. 2 we assume the practical
upper limit of endurance is 180 days. For the 180-day
coverage, the minimum number of missions (M) equals
1, while for the 360-day coverage M 5 2. Figure 3
presents the probability of providing continuous cover-
age with one or more deep gliders, for the two periods of
interest: 180 days and 360 days.
Figure 3 shows that for deep underwater gliders we
would need to deploy 10 gliders in order to achieve 0.95
probability of successfully providing continuous cover-
age for 180 days without replacement. A fleet of 20
gliders would be required to have a probability of 0.92
for continuous coverage over 360 days.
However, if we were to consider a shorter mission
length, where possible, it would yield a different re-
quirement in terms of the number of gliders. For ex-
ample, for deep underwater gliders, a mission length of
25 days would have a probability of premature end of
0.27. If we were to run four gliders per a 25-day mission
over a period of 360 days, the probability of providing
coverage is 0.93. At least eight gliders would be needed,
and this would imply that we would have to rotate the
gliders 14 times during the year. The fleet size and
mission length combinations can be selected to meet
a desirable, or at least acceptable, coverage target.
The above-mentioned results indicate that shorter
deployments will achieve the same level of confidence
while having fewer gliders deployed at any one time.
However, in practice the choice of strategy would also
have to take into account the cost of different scenarios
and other factors.
The calculations given above are very conservative and
are intended to give an indication of the number of ve-
hicles required. In practice it will not always be necessary
to recover all gliders at the same time. A more efficient
strategy would be to recover each glider only when nec-
essary; however, it is important to take into consideration
the time required to organize a new deployment and for
a glider to navigate to the operational area.
b. Virtual mooring array case study
If currents are not stronger than the glider’s speed,
then a glider can be programmed to perform repeated
profiles while holding a horizontal position nearly con-
stant. This mode of sampling is known as a virtual
mooring. An example of this is the virtual mooring array
FIG. 3. Probability of successfully completing the two observation targets for a fleet of 1–10 gliders: (a) shallow gliders and (b) deep gliders.
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deployed for 10 days in the Philippine Sea, east of Luzon
Strait (Hodges and Fratantoni 2009). During this ex-
periment five Slocum shallow gliders were deployed in
five different positions.
Using the analysis in the previous section, we can
consider the likely success of this array if it were con-
tinued for a period of 6 months. The probability of at
least one virtual mooring failure is calculated as follows:
pfm5 12 (12 pf1)(1 2 pf2)(12 pf3)(12 pf4)(12 pf5),
where pfi is the probability of the glider holding station i
failing to maintain the station for 6 months. We will as-
sume that shallow gliders are used. Given that the prob-
ability of failure for a single 60-day mission is 0.49, and
that three sequential 60-day missions are required, pfi is
easily calculated as 0.867. Therefore, the probability of at
least one failure over three deployments at each of the
five sites of the proposed network is 0.999 96. This puts
a requirement for adding underwater glider redundancy
at each station. If each station comprises four un-
derwater gliders, then the probability that at least one of
the four gliders at each site will complete a single 60-day
mission (pfm1) is 1 2 0.49
45 0.9424. Thus, the probability
of continuous monitoring of three sequential de-
ployments of four gliders at one site is 0.837, and the
probability of all five sites having continuous records is
0.411. Using the binomial distribution, we evaluate the
probability of at least four, three, and two sites being
successful is 0.811, 0.967, and 0.997.
c. Glider network for a synoptic view of the oceanic
mesoscale variability case study
L’Hévéder et al. (2013) considered the minimum
number of gliders needed to sample mesoscale vari-
ability. The authors propose to deploy an array of gliders
in a comb structure. The optimal number of gliders was
selected to maximize the analysis skill evaluation ob-
jective and to minimize the objective analysis error. The
analysis skill evaluation objective was quantified by
a combination of the root-mean-square error and the
spatial pattern correlation between the glider network’s
simulated data and the controlled field data. The ob-
jective analysis error objective was calculated based on
the minimum error variance. The authors demonstrated
that the optimum number of gliders necessary to sample
mesoscale variability was 10. We will assume that all the
gilders are deep gilders. In the previous section, we
considered the number of gliders that needed to be de-
ployed, so that there would be a high probability of one
or more of them completing the mission. An alternative
strategy would be, if it is possible, to replace each glider
that fails during the mission. When large numbers of
gliders are needed, such as in this example, we expect
this strategy to require fewer resources. However,
coverage will not be as complete when we take into
account the time required to replace a vehicle. Here we
consider the number of gliders required for this strategy.
To do so we make the assumption that the failure rate is
constant in time. If the probability of a glider failing in
a given time interval DT is p(DT), given a batch of N
gliders, the probability of x of them failing is
q(x,DT)5B(x,N,p) , (10)
where B is the binomial distribution. In the limit of DT
being very small, we can ignore the possibility of mul-
tiple failures in any one time interval and so the prob-
ability of there being L failures during a time T5MDT
is approximately
Q(L,T,N)5B(L,M,q) , (11)
where
q5 q(1,DT)5Np(12 p)N21 . (12)
The probability distribution of the number of replace-
ments for a 10-glider deployment is shown in Fig. 4. For
a typical survivability of 0.5 for a 90-day deep glider
deployment, the expected number of replacements is 7
and there is a 16% chance that 10 or more gliders will be
needed.
d. Improving reliability
Reliability improvement of underwater gliders will be
possible if communication between users and manu-
facturers is proactive, enabling the discussion of failure
modes and potential mitigation activities. Such re-
liability improvement has occurred on profiling floats.
Profiling floats had a target life expectancy of 4 years,
performing 150 cycles during this period. However, in
2001 only 20% of the Autonomous Profiling Explorer
(APEX) floats could meet this requirement (Kobayashi
et al. 2009). The fact that faulty floats could not be re-
covered made it difficult to identify the root causes for
failures. Nevertheless, research institutes and the man-
ufacturer engaged in fault investigations and a number
of improvements were made as a result. For example,
the batteries of the early floats had a design vulnerability
that meant that every time a battery cell was damaged, it
caused a chain reaction, in which other battery cells in
the same pack would also fail. The battery circuit design
was changed; a diode was introduced between cells, so
that if one cell is damaged, it will not damage the cell
next to it. Another improvement was made with regard
to the piston used to control the buoyancy. The pump
used in the early APEX float allowed small sediments to
mix with the oil. This would eventually cause the piston
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to get stuck in a fixed position. A new pump was de-
signed by the manufacturer that did not have this failure
mode.
In this section we study the impact of reliability im-
provement in the confidence that the glider network
design will meet the observation target.
First, we consider the case of a single measurement
location as in section 7a. Figure 3 shows that if the re-
liability of an underwater glider is increased to 90%, this
results in a high confidence that the coverage target will
be met with fewer gliders. For deep gliders, a de-
ployment of two gliders would give a confidence of 98%
that the target measurements would be obtained with
one or more gliders for a period of 360 days.
For the multiple glider deployment considered in
section 7c, Fig. 4 shows that if the success rate for 90-day
missions can be increased from 0.5 to 0.9, then the
number of gliders required to ensure a 10-glider de-
ployment is likely to be greatly reduced, with the ex-
pected number of replacements being one and the
chance of needing three or more being only 9%.
If the top three failuremodes identified in this study—
leaks, battery failure, and buoyancy pump failure—are
mitigated, this would lead to a change in the risk profile.
Figure 5 presents the survival distribution for consider-
ing that the top three failure modes were completely
mitigated. Each failure was replaced with a censored
entry, since each failure resulted in an early mission
termination. Thus, replacing the failure flag with a cen-
sored flag would not result in a risk improvement.
Therefore, we assume that the endurance for each one
of these failure entries equals the average of the en-
durance of all missions that were successful. For shallow
underwater gliders, the average endurance of all suc-
cessful missions was 13 days, while for deep underwater
gliders this was 43 days.
The probability of shallow glider surviving, with no
premature mission end, a 60-day mission is 0.58, a 0.09
increase from the unmitigated case. The probability of
a deep glider surviving a 180-day mission is 0.48, a 0.2
increase from the unmitigated case.
8. Discussion and conclusions
The paper presents a probabilistic framework for
calculating the coverage that can be achieved by a fleet
of underwater gliders. We showed how the probability
of successfully meeting a required coverage can be cal-
culated using the survival estimate for a given mission.
We use this framework for estimating the coverage for
two proposed ocean sampling networks.
In the examples provided, we considered that all
missions were of equal endurance. In practical terms
missions can be of different endurance. In addition, in
FIG. 4. Probability density function for the number of failures in a 90-day deployment of 10
gliders. The probability of a single glider surviving a 90-day mission is assumed to be 0.5
(continuous line), 0.8 (dashed line), and 0.9 (dotted line).
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the examples, we considered that the vehicles were
deployed concurrently. Again, this may not be the case
in practice. However, despite these assumptions, the
probabilistic formalism presented in this paper still ap-
plies to the different scenarios mentioned.
A crucial aspect of this analysis is that the survival
profiles for each vehicle type were created based on
unbiased data. The users consisted of people that were
not involved in the development life cycle of underwater
gliders. For these users the underwater gliders come as
a COTS product. The framework proposed here for
estimating the coverage obtained by a fleet of under-
water gliders was derived from first principles of prob-
ability theory. This framework can be used to support
the survey design of any organization, including orga-
nizations that have been involved in the development
life cycle of underwater gliders, which comprise more
experienced users. This is possible provided that the
organization uses their own operation data to generate
the risk profiles.
We used fault history data from 205 glider missions,
provided by nondevelopers, to build risk profiles with
endurance. We concluded that the risk profiles of dif-
ferent underwater glider makes are not statistically sig-
nificant. Therefore, our analysis focused on two classes
of gliders: deep and shallow. For shallow gliders we
concluded that the probability of not aborting a 30-day
mission is approximately 0.5. For deep underwater
gliders, the probability of not aborting a 90-day mission
is approximately 0.59. A key observation is that suc-
cessful glider deployments with vehicles available today
imply conducting missions that are well below the
maximum endurance of the vehicle.
These glider failure profiles have a similarity in form
to those of relatively early APEX floats (2000–01 and
2003) in the analysis of Kobayashi et al. (2009). APEX
floats deployed in subsequent years generally showed
a growth in reliability, such that by 2006 the probability
of completing 100 cycles was over 90%, compared with
;20% in 2000–01. The challenge for manufacturers is to
achieve the same reliability growth for gliders.
In targeting this reliability issue, user feedback to
manufacturers to inform ongoing developments by
manufacturers is important. By doing so the glider re-
liability can increase, as has shown to be possible from
the APEX float experience reviewed in this paper.
If, for example, the probability of failure for a 180-day
deep glider mission could be reduced from 0.73 to 0.25,
then the number of gliders needed to be deployed si-
multaneously to achieve 95% coverage would be re-
duced from 10 to 3.
Underwater gliders are arguably one of the most sig-
nificant technology developments in autonomous un-
derwater sampling. They provide an effective way to
conduct marine science surveys and, for some missions,
they completely eliminate the costs associated with
surface vessels. The perception is that underwater
gliders are a relatively cheap alternative to measure-
ments made from ships and moorings. However, in this
paper we have shown that in order to achieve a high
level of confidence in obtaining data, multiple un-
derwater gliders are required. Therefore, when evalu-
ating the cost of underwater glider observations, the
number of vehicles required to meet the necessary level
of confidence needs to be considered. Using current
technology and practices, a high level of confidence may
require a costly operation. However, if glider manufac-
turers and operators can achieve a similar improvement
in reliability as was made for Argo floats, then the costs
will fall significantly.
Validation of risk estimation, in general, is a difficult
task. We believe that for underwater gliders this is
FIG. 5. Underwater glider survival taking into account mitigation of the top three failure modes: leaks, battery
failures, and buoyancy pump failure: (left) shallow gliders and (right) deep gliders.
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a particularly difficult task because these platforms are
constantly evolving. The faults presented in this study
generated lessons learned that were disseminated by all
partners. It is possible to validate the estimated risk
profiles for the underwater gliders by comparing the risk
profiles presented in this paper with the risk profiles
generated using data collected since this study. In
making this comparison we must take into account the
impact of fault mitigation. This can be achieved using
the approach presented in Brito et al. (2012). The sta-
tistical tests discussed in this paper—the Wilcoxon and
the log-rank tests—can be applied to compare the two
risk profiles, prior to 2012—presented in this paper—
and after 2012, the results of a future study.
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